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 ABSTRACT 
 
  
 
Available evidence suggests that the average marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from 
the 2001 tax rebate in the US was not nearly as large as that from previous tax cuts. We 
examine if this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the widespread use of credit cards 
has made borrowing accessible for most US households by constructing a model that simulates 
the dynamic effect of relaxed borrowing constraints. Our model uses Kreps-Porteus preferences 
which account for independent measures of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, both of which can theoretically affect the willingness to save or 
spend. Our model shows that the average MPC drops substantially immediately after 
borrowing constraints are relaxed because few consumers have binding borrowing constraints 
at that time. The model also shows that consumers gradually reduce their wealth after 
borrowing constraints are relaxed, causing more of them to have binding constraints over time, 
which in turn causes the average MPC to rise gradually to a new steady state value that is 
slightly lower than the original value. This dynamic pattern of the MPC suggests that a greater 
ability to borrow with credit cards could explain the lower effectiveness of the 2001 tax rebate. 
In addition, the model predicts that consumers choose to hold lower amounts of liquid assets for 
precautionary reasons when they have a greater ability to borrow unsecured debt. 
 
 
 
 
실증연구들은 2001년 미국의 세금 환급에
서 나타난 평균적인 한계소비성향이 이전의 
조세 감축에서 보여진 한계소비성향보다 감소
되었음을 암시하고 있다. 우리는 이와 같은 
현상이 신용카드의 광범위한 사용으로 대부분
의 미국 가계에서 차입이 쉬워짐으로써 발생
하였다는 것을 차입제약 완화의 동태적 효과
를 분석하는 시뮬레이션을 통하여 고찰한다. 
우리 모형은 위험 기피도와 시점 간 대체탄력
성을 독립적으로 결정하는 Kreps-Porteus 
선호를 사용하여 차입제약이 완화된 직후 한
계소비성향이 크게 하락하였음을 보여주고 
 있다. 우리 모형은 또한 차입제약이 완화된 
후, 소비자들이 자산을 감소시켜 완화된 차입
제약의 구속력이 서서히 커져서 한계소비성
향이 이전보다 약간 낮은 새로운 정상상태로 
서서히 상승됨을 보여주고 있다. 이러한 한계
소비성향의 동태적 패턴은 신용카드 사용으
로 인한 차입제약 완화가 2001년 세금환급에
서 이전보다 낮은 한계소비성향을 야기하였
음을 의미한다. 그리고 우리의 모형은 차입제
약이 완화되었을 때 소비자들이 예비적 유동
자산을 낮은 수준에서 유지한다는 것을 보여
주고 있다. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
To counteract the prolonged effects of the financial crises in several countries, 
many governments have tried to cut taxes and to raise their spending. G20 countries 
in 2009 agreed to stimulus packages worth an average 2% of GDP. The effectiveness 
of such fiscal stimulus policies depend on the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) 
from changes in income for the average consumer, but economists continue to debate 
the empirical value of the average MPC and the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus 
policies more generally. In particular, some empirical studies have argued that the 
MPC from income shocks has declined during the last one or two decades by 
estimating the MPC from the 2001 tax rebate and comparing it to that from previous 
tax-cuts. For example, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) found that 43% of surveyed 
consumers were willing to spend the temporary increase in their take-home income 
in response to the changes in income tax withholding in 1992, even though the 
temporary increase in income was likely to be offset by a decrease in a tax refund or 
an increase in tax payments in 1993. Using a similar survey, Shapiro and Slemrod 
(2003) reported that only 22% of respondents were willing to spend the initial 2001 
tax rebate in 2001. Although the authors use the same survey methodology and 
similar questionnaires, the differences in the responses are perplexing. 1 
The differences in the survey responses indicate that the average MPC has 
changed. Furthermore, when we use assumptions about the distribution of the MPC 
across consumers in Shapiro and Slemrod (2002), we are able to calculate that the 
average MPC has fallen from approximately 0.47 in 1992 to approximately 0.33 in 
2001.2 
Other evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the average MPC has 
declined over time. A University of Michigan survey, cited in the Christian Science 
Monitor, reported that only $8.36 billion out of the $38 billion 2001 tax rebate checks 
was spent. Also, a New York Times/CBS News poll in May 1982 found that 
approximately 50% of consumers in a survey said that they would spend the 
increase in take-home income due to the tax cuts proposed by the Reagan 
administration (Souleles (2002)), while Gallup Poll in July 2001 reported that only 17% 
of respondents said that they would spend the 2001 tax rebate (Shapiro and Slemrod 
(2002)).  
Other empirical studies also indicate that the recent average MPC is no larger 
                                                          
1 Survey questions in Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) and Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) differ slightly: 
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) asked whether the recipient would spend the temporary increase in take-
home income, whereas Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) asked whether the tax cut would increase spending or 
saving. We can think of no reason of how the large difference in the survey responses can be explained by 
the subtle differences in the survey questions. 
2 These calculations produce estimates that are fairly robust across different assumptions about the 
parameters used to specify the distribution of the MPC from Shapiro and Slemrod (2002). See the 
Appendix for perturbations of the average MPC when these distribution parameters change. 
4    韓國開發硏究 / 2011. Ⅳ  
 
 
than the average MPC from two decades ago. Souleles (2002) estimates the average 
MPC in response to the 1982 tax cut to lie between 0.662 and 0.998 at a 5% 
significance level one year after the tax cut was implemented. Johnson, Parker, and 
Souleles (2006) estimate the average MPC in response to the 2001 tax cut to lie 
between 0.2 and 0.4 at a 10% significance level for the first three month period when 
the rebate was received. The authors then show that the estimated overall MPC rose 
to about 0.66 at a 10% significance level six months after the 2001 rebate was received, 
and that the MPC thereafter was small and insignificant. 
Souleles (2002) and other authors have speculated that the apparent differences in 
the average MPC over time can be explained by a mental accounting hypothesis, 
where consumers save a large portion of a large lump-sum payment, but spend a 
large portion of incremental amounts from paychecks. (See Thaler (1990) for a 
general explanation of this hypothesis.) The foundation for this speculation is that 
the 1982 tax cuts and the 1992 withholding change were delivered to households 
through a reduction in taxes withheld from paychecks, while the 2001 tax cuts were 
delivered by mailing tax rebate checks. 
However, we investigate a different explanation for the estimated fall in the 
average MPC out of temporary income shocks by using the fact that widespread use 
of credit cards has made borrowing accessible for most US households. The 2001 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) reports that 76.2% of the US households have at 
least one credit card and two thirds of households hold positive amounts of credit 
card debt (see Aizcorbe, Kennickell and Moore (2003) and Laibson, Repetto and 
Tobacman (2003)). In addition, credit card debt has grown over 10% per year since 
the 1970s, implying approximately a 250% growth rate per decade (see Yoo (1998)). 
Using results from Castronova and Hagstrom (2004) and the 2001 SCF, we show in 
Table 1 that the ratio between the median total credit limit from credit cards (as a 
measure of unsecured borrowing potential) per household and the median income per 
household has risen from approximately 0.3 in 1992 to nearly 0.5 in 1998 and 2001.3 
To analyze the theoretical relationship between the average MPC and borrowing 
constraints, Carroll and Kimball (1996) compare a model with uncertainty and 
complete borrowing constraints to one where consumers have perfect foresight and 
can borrow as much as they like, as is typically assumed in the permanent/life-cycle 
income hypothesis. The authors show that the introduction of uncertainty and 
borrowing constraints causes the predicted average MPC to rise relative to the 
perfect foresight and unconstrained case and that the predicted MPC rises more for 
consumers with low amounts of liquid wealth than for those with high amounts of 
liquid wealth. Ludvigson (1999) shows that consumption responds to expected 
changes in consumer credit and suggests that increases in access to credit may 
induce less excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable changes in income. 
Using the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, however, Carroll 
(2001) argues that a high growth rate in income and/or a high rate of discounting 
enjoyment in the future (or specifically the ―impatience‖ of consumers) are the main 
factors that determine the MPC, rather than borrowing constraints per se. Kimball 
                                                          
3 Ludvigson (1999) also shows that the ratio of consumer loans to personal income has also grown by 
more than 200% since World War II. 
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and Weil (2009) separate the effects of risk aversion and the willingness move 
resources across time and examine how these two effects determine precautionary saving in 
a two-period Kreps-Porteus model. 
We extend Kimball and Weil‘s (2009) analysis by using a specific form of Kreps-
Porteus preferences called Esptein-Zin preferences, which can be used in a multi-
period simulation of how consumers may want to save or to borrow over time. More 
specifically, this paper also studies the theoretical effect of relaxing borrowing 
constraints on the average MPC, but it extends previous work in two directions. It 
uses the Kreps-Porteus preferences 4  in a multi-period model 5  instead of the 
commonly used CRRA preferences and analyzes the dynamics of the average MPC 
as well as its steady state predicted values.  
Kreps-Porteus preferences are useful because they allow independent 
representations of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution, both of which may 
independently affect how much people want to spend and save. Relative risk 
aversion represents how much people dislike changes in the amount of resources 
they have over time due to external risks that they have no control over (such as a job 
loss caused by company wide layoffs). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
represents how willing people are to save and borrow over time (to substitute 
resources intertemporally) given a change in the relevant interest rate. Furthermore, 
as borrowing constraints are relaxed, our model shows that the willingness to save 
for precautionary reasons will decrease more when risk aversion is low, thereby 
raising the MPC from additional income available today. But as borrowing 
constraints are relaxed, willingness to borrow future resources may increase more 
when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high, thereby lowering the MPC 
from additional income available today. Thus, these two effects may offset each other 
under CRRA preferences due to the inverse relation between relative risk aversion 
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. With Kreps-Porteus preferences, 
however, we are able to control the size of these two effects independently by 
identifying separate parameters for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and 
relative risk aversion. (See Kreps and Porteus (1978)). 
We also consider how the average MPC from temporary income changes and the 
amount of assets may change over time until these values become stable in a self-
defined steady state, where the mean, median and standard deviation of the 
distribution of cash-on-hand do not significantly change after many iterations (up to 
100 periods). When borrowing constraints are relaxed in the model to simulate 
greater borrowing capacity through credit cards, the model predicts two effects.  
First, fewer consumers should have binding borrowing constraints at that time, so 
that more consumers would be able to smooth intertemporal consumption by saving 
or borrowing given preferences about intertemporal substitution. Also, after 
borrowing constraints are relaxed, consumers with a precautionary motive to save 
                                                          
4 Epstein-Zin preferences are a mathematical specification of the more general Kreps-Porteus theory.  We 
use Epstein-Zin preferences in our simulations, but refer to the preferences as Kreps-Porteus preferences in the paper 
where appropriate because of their generality and because the theory was created before the Epstein-Zin specification.  
5 Haliassos and Michaelides (2000) also use Kreps-Porteus preferences in a multi-period model but 
focus on presenting computational techniques to solve household portfolio choice problems. 
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can afford to reduce the level of precautionary assets given preferences about risk 
aversion. Thus, we study the dynamics of the average MPC immediately after a 
change in borrowing conditions and thereafter as consumers adjust their 
precautionary wealth. We have found that the decline of the average MPC 
immediately after relaxing borrowing constraints is comparable to the estimated 
drop in the MPC, while the decline of the MPC at the new steady state can explain 
10%-20% of the estimated drop. To the degree that borrowing constraints were 
relaxed in the US in early 2000s, our model can then partially explain empirical 
findings from previous studies. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an optimization 
problem for a representative consumer with uncertain labor income and with a 
specified amount of credit card borrowing potential; it then explains how the 
analysis in this paper is conducted. Section 3 examines simulation results from the 
initial steady state before borrowing constraints are relaxed to the new steady state 
after they are relaxed, and then examines the path of the average MPC over time. 
Section 4 offers concluding remarks. 
Ⅱ. The Model and Simulation Methodology 
1. The Model 
 
Rather than relying on behavioral assumptions, we examine whether a model 
with forward-looking consumers who respond optimally to changes in credit 
availability can explain the apparent decline in the average MPC out of temporary 
income shocks.  
Formally, we model a representative consumer who is assumed to want to 
maximize the benefit from consumption resources over time according to the 
following specification of Kreps-Porteus preferences:  
 
  /1/1 ])}({)1[(max  tttt UECU      (1) 
 
subject to: 
 
11 )(   tttt YCXRX         (2) 
 
111   ttt PY            (3) 
 
11   ttt NGPP           (4) 
 
ttt CkPX            (5) 
 
1 0TX              (6) 
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where tE  denotes the conditional expectation given information at time t, 
)1,0(  is related to the future discount factor in the Epstein-Zin specification of 
Kreps-Porteus preferences,6 R denotes the gross interest rate on a single, risk-free 
asset, tC  denotes a composite measure of consumption expenditure at time t, tY  denotes 
labor income at time t, and tX  denotes resources, or "cash-on-hand", available for 
consumption. tP  is the expected long run average or ―permanent‖ component of 
income from labor services, and t  and tN  are temporary and permanent 
changes in labor income, respectively. t  can be interpreted as temporary bonuses, 
lay-offs or illnesses without sick leave, while tN  can be interpreted as promotions 
or demotions in one‘s career. G, the gross growth rate of tP , is assumed to be 
constant and is meant to reflect the long run average growth rate of the 
macroeconomy and real income. The logarithm of labor income shocks, tln  and 
tNln , are assumed to be independently, identically, and normally distributed with 
mean zero and variances 
2
  and 
2
N , respectively. This assumption implies that 
zero income shocks will not occur with positive probability. 
Equation (1) shows the time-inseparable Epstein-Zin (1989) specification of 
Kreps-Porteus preferences, which allows separate parameters for the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution and relative risk aversion, both of which may affect the 
willingness to spend or save. As borrowing constraints are relaxed, the willingness to 
spend additional income may fall on average because fewer consumers are 
completely constrained from borrowing. This effect would lower the average MPC 
from additional income available today as borrowing constraints are relaxed because 
of a greater ability to borrow from future resources instead. Additional income 
available today could be saved or used to repay debt, another form of saving, instead 
of used to increase consumption expenditure. In addition, the relaxation of 
borrowing constraints weakens the precautionary saving motive, as Carroll and 
Kimball (2001) show with a CRRA model. Consumers should feel less of a need to 
maintain assets to protect against unforeseen income shocks when they are able to 
borrow in the event of unexpectedly low income. Predicted levels of assets therefore 
fall as borrowing constraints are relaxed as long as consumers are impatient, so that 
when the optimal consumption function is concave, the slope of the function—the 
MPC—will rise as wealth falls. The first effect, which we call the intertemporal 
substitution effect may be influenced by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution if 
its value affects the willingness to borrow, in particular at low levels of wealth when 
                                                          
6 Bishop (2008) shows that in general the future discount factor in the Epstein-Zin specification 
depends on the state of nature (the level of available resources) and factors that influence the state of 
nature such as the growth rate of income, unforeseen changes in income, as well as the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, relative risk aversion and a measure (β) that represents how we feel about the 
trade-off between consuming resources today or consuming them in the future. 
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the ability to borrow is more likely constrained. The second effect, which we call the 
precautionary dissaving effect, increases when consumers have lower risk aversion, 
since precautionary saving—an example of prudence—is directly related to relative 
risk aversion.  
In a CRRA model, these two effects may interfere with each other, since the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is constrained to be the inverse of relative risk 
aversion. However, even if these two effects offset each other, it is possible to obtain 
a clearer prediction of how these two effects change when the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution and relative risk aversion independently change in a 
Kreps-Porteus model.  
The parameter  is negatively related to relative risk aversion, which is equal to 
1–. The parameter  is directly related to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 
which is equal to 1/(1–). The commonly used CRRA utility function is a special case 
of Kreps-Porteus preferences when   .  
While equations (1) through (4) (and (6)) are conventional, equation (5) is 
different from previous models in that it allows the representative consumer to 
borrow up to a constant fraction of permanent labor income )( tkP , where 0k  
and k is known to consumers. The model simplifies reality by assuming that k (as 
well as preferences, interest rates and the growth of real income from labor services) 
is exogenous and constant across time and across consumers, although to make the 
model more realistic we may want to allow k to depend on the endogenous level of 
permanent income, which does vary across time and across consumers. A change in 
the borrowing limits of credit cards or in consumer loan scores would change the 
borrowing capacity for consumers and is modeled as changes in k. When 0k , the 
representative consumer is not allowed to borrow at all, and as k increases, the 
borrowing constraint (5) is relaxed. Thus, borrowing constraints are modeled as quantity 
constraints rather than price constraints, i.e., rather than a gap between borrowing and lending 
rates. Consistent with this model, Jappelli (1990) presents evidence that consumers who 
are unable to borrow or ―discouraged‖ from borrowing from financial institutions 
frequently are young (without an established credit history) and have low income, 
two characteristics that can proxy for permanent income. 
Equation (6) says that the representative consumer must pay back all debts before 
he dies. In other words, he cannot declare bankruptcy during his lifetime after 
borrowing exogenous resources.  
Maximization problems like the one above have no analytic solution due to 
uncertainty in future labor income, and thus require numerical analysis in order to 
obtain a solution. In the analysis, we take advantage of the recursive nature of the 
problem and then by normalizing all variables by tP  to reduce the number of state 
variables.7 After normalization, the constrained maximization problem (using a 
value function that represents the maximized utility function) is written as  
 
  /1/111 )]))([()1((max)(  ttttttt GNxvEcxv    (7) 
                                                          
7 The state of nature for the representative consumer before normalization is described by the levels of 
permanent income and "cash-on-hand" or available resources to spend on current consumption. 
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subject to: 
 
1
1
1 )( 

  ttt
t
t cx
GN
R
x          (8) 
 
tt ckx            (9) 
 
01 Tx .                                                             (10) 
 
Lower-case variables represent upper-case variables normalized by the value of 
permanent income: 111 /   ttt PXx , ttt PXx /  and ttt PCc / . The 
function tv  represents the value function of resources today normalized by tP , 
and the function 1tv  represents the value function of resources in the next period 
normalized by 1tP .8 For a programming exercise, we set a finite time period T and 
also constrain the Kreps-Porteus problem to the terminal condition (10). 
We solve the above problem under two sets of "impatience" parameter values, β =  
1/1.05, R = 1.02, G = 1.02 and β = 0.9598, R = 1.0344, G = 1.03. The parameter values 
in the first set are from Ludvigson and Michaelides (2000) and those in the second set 
are either estimates in Gourinchas and Parker (2002) (in the case of   and R) or are 
the baseline values from Carroll (1997) (in the case of G). Based on empirical estimates 
from Carroll (1992), the standard deviations   and N  are both set equal to 0.10. 
In the analysis, we use approximations of the distributions of t  and tN  by selecting a 
finite set of discrete points from the distributions.9 
In order for the finite horizon results of the numerical analysis to converge to the 
infinite horizon solution, the ―impatience condition‖ must hold. Epstein and Zin 
(1989) outline two impatience conditions for Kreps-Porteus preferences, depending 
on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. When the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution is greater than 1 (when  is greater than zero), the impatience condition 
equals 
 
1[ ]t tR E GN G              (11a) 
 
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one (when  is less 
than zero), the impatience condition equals 
 
                                                          
8 The variables GNt+1, representing the change in permanent income each period, appears in the 
future value function vt+1 because the equation is normalized by current permanent income. Also, see 
Bishop (2008) for the steps involved in normalizing this function. 
9 All analyses in this paper are done by Mathematica 5, and the programs are available upon request.  
Appendix 2 describes the optimization and simulation methods. 
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1 (1/ ) 1eisR R                (11b) 
 
where eis equals the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We focus on (11b) in the 
Kreps-Porteus simulations because (11a) fails to hold for our specification of the 
interest rate and the growth rate of income. We do, however, use the case where the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution equals one, a knife-edge case between (11a) 
and (11b).  
Bishop (2008) derives a non-separable impatience condition that is independent 
of the value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution when the growth rate of 
income is bounded: 
 
δR < 1               (12) 
 
where δ is a function of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, relative risk 
aversion, exogenous variables that define the state of nature for consumers (the level 
of assets, the expected or average growth rate of income and changes in income), the 
benefit (utility) that we feel from consuming resources, the interest rate that we can 
earn from saving resources or the interest rate that we must pay when borrowing 
resources, and β, which represents how we feel about the trade-off between 
consuming resources today versus in the future.10 An interesting characteristic of δ 
is that it depends on the state of nature and it approaches zero when consumers are 
borrowing constrained, making (12) easy to satisfy for a finite interest rate. In 
simulation results provided below, we satisfy (11b) and (12) to be sure that the 
optimal consumption functions converge after several iterations. 
The impatience conditions are labeled such because they are satisfied when 
consumers are impatient (i.e.,   is low); but they can also be satisfied when the 
growth rate of income is high, making the future income look high relative to present 
income. Although the effect of the interest rate is ambiguous in (11b), when the 
return on saving is low in (11a), present consumption looks attractive relative to 
future consumption, and consumers become more impatient. Regardless of the 
underlying cause, when these conditions are satisfied and borrowing constraints are 
relaxed, the representative consumer is willing to borrow from future resources 
rather than save for the future. 
 
2. Simulation Methodology 
 
In the simulations, we focus on an increase in k from 0.3 to 0.5 to reflect the 
median total credit limit relative to the median income per household from 1992 to 
2001, as shown in Table 1.11 
We compute the optimal consumption functions for both values of k using 
backward induction, starting from a terminal period T = 100, sufficiently long to  
                                                          
10 Specifically, Bishop (2008) solves for δ as β[Et[vt+1(RSt/GNt+1 + εt+1)α]](ρ-α)/α ∙ Et[vt+1(RSt/GNt+1 + εt+1)α-1 
∙ vt1-ρ ] where St is the value of saved assets. 
11 The dynamic pattern of the MPC is robust for other values of k. The complete results when k = 0, 0.1, 
0.2, 0.3, 0.5, and 0.6 are available upon request. 
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<Table 1> The Relaxation of Borrowing Constraints, 1992-2001 
 
 1992 1995 1998 2001 
Median Total Credit Limit of Bank 
Type Cards 
9300a,c 11765a,c 16043a,c 18000b,d 
Median Household Income 30400a,e 32700a,e 33400a,e 39900b,f 
Ratio (k) 0.3059 0.3598 0.4803 0.4511 
Notes: a The unit is 1998 US dollars. b The unit is 2001 US dollars. c The source is Castronova and 
Hagstrom (2004). d The source is the authors‘ calculation from 2001 SCF. e The source is Kennickell 
(2000). f The source is Aizcorbe et al. (2003). Bank type cards are credit cards issued by Visa, 
Mastercard, Discover and Optima. 
 
 
[Figure 1] Optimal Consumption Functions under Kreps-Porteus Preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
allow the consumption functions to converge according to the condition 
000001.01  tt cc  for the highest level of normalized cash-on-hand, where t 
represents an arbitrary period.  
Figure 1 represents changes in the optimal consumption function as borrowing 
constraints change under the second set of impatience parameter values.12 As k 
increases, the consumption function shifts up and to the left, implying less saving or 
greater borrowing to achieve a fixed level of consumption, or more intuitively, 
greater consumption at a fixed level of resources. This finding suggests that even 
consumers who are not currently constrained also increase spending as borrowing 
capacity increases, a claim consistent with Gross and Souleles (2002). Those authors 
find that consumers who are not currently borrowing constrained increase their 
consumption slightly in response to an increase in borrowing capacity from credit 
                                                          
12 The shape and response of the optimal consumption function are qualitatively the same under the 
other set of impatience parameters. 
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cards. They argue that consumers with non-binding constraints raise their 
consumption due to a weakened precautionary saving motive after borrowing 
constraints are relaxed. 
We use these converged consumption functions, which approximate the optimal 
consumption function for an infinite horizon problem, to define the MPC out of 
temporary income shocks and evaluate its properties as the borrowing parameter k 
and the parameters governing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and 
relative risk aversion change. We calculate the MPC for each consumer from the 
following equation:   
 
)('
)))(/(( 11
t
t
tttt
tt
t xc
d
cxGNRdc
dP
dC
MPC 

 



.       (13) 
 
Thus, equation (13) measures the MPC from ―temporary‖ income changes, such 
as those from the tax code change in 1991 or the tax rebate in 2001. We calculate the 
average of (13) across consumers with different levels of cash-on-hand. 
Using the optimal consumption function, we simulate the behavior of 4,000 consumers 
to examine the dynamic pattern of the MPC out of temporary income changes when 
the entire population experiences the same change in k but each individual 
experiences different simulated exogenous income changes. Income shocks are 
randomly drawn from log normal distributions based on empirical evidence from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (See Carroll (1992)). To simplify the analysis, 
we assume that consumers do not start their working lives with any saved assets.13 
Given this zero initial endowment and beliefs about expected future income, each 
consumer is programmed to optimally decide how much to consume and save each 
period over his lifetime. Given this behavior, the population of consumers generates 
a simulated distribution of normalized assets and normalized cash-on-hand that 
achieves a stable mean, median and standard deviation over time when the 
impatience conditions are satisfied. 
After calculating the average MPC from the stable distribution of normalized 
cash-on-hand for k = 0.3, we increase k to 0.5, compute the corresponding optimal 
consumption function and then recalculate the average MPC from the distribution of 
normalized cash-on-hand during each period after the change in borrowing capacity 
until a new steady state is reached. 
Ⅲ. Simulation Results 
In this section, we present the dynamic pattern of the average MPC from the 
simulation to understand whether greater borrowing capacity could reduce the 
effectiveness of tax rebates in stimulating consumption expenditure.  
                                                          
13 We also used initial wealth estimates from Gourinchas and Parker (2002), but they had no 
substantial effects on the average MPC after several periods. 
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Figures 2 and 3 plot the simulated average MPC out of temporary income 
changes over time. Time 0 indicates the initial steady state when the borrowing 
constraint parameter, k, is equal to 0.3, and Time 1 indicates the period during which 
the borrowing constrains are relaxed from k = 0.3 to k = 0.5. For comparison, the 
estimated MPC in the years of 1992 and 2001 are marked as two horizontal dotted 
lines. Under the assumptions about the distribution of the MPC across consumers in 
Shapiro and Slemrod (2002), the average MPC is estimated to have fallen from 0.47 in 
1992 to 0.33 in 2001. When the risk aversion coefficient (rra) is one (two or three) and 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (eis) is one (1/2 or 1/3), the results in 
Figures 2 and 3 can be interpreted as those under ordinary CRRA preferences with 
the CRRA coefficient being one (two or three). Because we can put independent 
values for rra and eis, we can better predict the effects of changes in the average 
MPC with the Kreps-Porteus preferences. 
Figures 2 and 3 show that when the borrowing constrains are relaxed from k = 0.3 
to k = 0.5, the average MPC drops immediately and substantially because consumers 
have a weakened precautionary saving motive and therefore are predicted to reduce 
their  assets. During this time, few consumers have binding borrowing constraints 
unless they suffer from an enormous negative income shock. As a result, additional 
temporary income from a tax rebate or tax cut is predicted to be mostly saved for 
future consumption so that the average MPC in the current period is predicted to be 
low.  
However, consumers are predicted to reduce their assets in response to the 
loosening borrowing constraints when the impatience conditions are satisfied. As 
assets are spent, more consumers will face binding borrowing constraints even with 
greater borrowing capacity, so that the average MPC is predicted to rise gradually to 
a new stable value. Figure 4 shows the dynamic pattern of the fraction of the 
population with binding constraints, which corresponds to that of the average MPC: 
after falling substantially when borrowing constraints are relaxed, it subsequently 
rises gradually. The average cash-on-hand declines gradually as the weakened 
precautionary saving motive causes consumers to reduce their assets. Both a 
growing fraction of consumers who are borrowing constrained and lower cash-on-
hand cause the average MPC to rise after its initial drop.14 
Figures 2 and 3 also show that the magnitude of the initial decrease in the 
predicted average MPC from the simulation approximately equals the estimated 
decrease in the average MPC for some of the specified parameter values. For 
example, the magnitude of the decrease in the average MPC is slightly larger than 
the estimated decrease in the average MPC when rra = 1 and eis = 0.33 with the first 
set of impatience parameters.  
After the initial drop, the average MPC gradually increases to a stable value, 
which we call a steady state value. Table 2 compares these steady state values when k 
= 0.3 and k = 0.5. Although the average MPCs in the steady state with k = 0.5 is lower 
                                                          
14 Figure 4 shows the dynamic pattern of the binding fraction and the cash-on-hand for eis = 0.5 under 
the first set of impatient parameter values and for eis = 0.33 under the second set of impatient parameter 
values. The plots under other combinations of eis and impatient parameter values are not reported to save 
space but they are qualitatively identical and available upon request. 
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[Figure 2] Dynamic Pattern of the MPC during the Transition: R=1.02, G=1.02, 
β=1/1.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Time 0 indicates the initial steady state with k = 0.3, while Time 1 indicates the period during which 
the borrowing constrains are relaxed from k = 0.3 to k = 0.5. The estimated MPC in the years of 1992 
and 2001 are also marked as the two horizontal dotted lines. ‗eis‘ denotes the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution and ‗rra‘ denotes the risk aversion coefficient in Kreps-Porteus 
preferences. 
 
 
[Figure 3] Dynamic Pattern of the MPC during the Transition: R=1.0344, G=1.03, 
β=0.9598 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Time 0 indicates the initial steady state with k = 0.3, while Time 1 indicates the period during which 
the borrowing constrains are relaxed from k = 0.3 to k = 0.5. The estimated MPC in the years of 1992 
and 2001 are also marked as the two horizontal dotted lines. ‗eis‘ denotes the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution and ‗rra‘ denotes the risk aversion coefficient in Kreps-Porteus 
preferences. 
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<Table 2> Borrowing Constraints and the MPCs at the Steady State 
 
R=1.02, G=1.02, β =1/1.05 
k 
30% 50% 
rra = 1 
eis = 0.01 0.409 0.396 
eis = 0.1 0.405 0.386 
eis = 0.33 0.486 0.457 
eis = 0.5 0.533 0.505 
eis = 1 0.640 0.610 
rra = 2 
eis = 0.01 0.312 0.297 
eis = 0.1 0.319 0.299 
eis = 0.33 0.394 0.367 
eis = 0.5  0.44 0.409 
eis = 1 0.548 0.511 
rra = 3 
eis = 0.01 0.206 0.188 
eis = 0.1 0.223 0.204 
eis = 0.33 0.292 0.264 
eis = 0.5 0.334 0.302 
eis = 1 0.428 0.391 
 
R=1.0344, G=1.03, β=.9598 
k 
30% 50% 
rra = 1 
eis = 0.01 0.532 0.514 
eis = 0.1 0.495 0.469 
eis = 0.33 0.509 0.484 
eis = 0.5 0.522 0.495 
eis = 1 0.542 0.516 
rra = 2 
eis = 0.01 0.455 0.429 
eis = 0.1 0.419 0.392 
eis = 0.33 0.425 0.396 
eis = 0.5 0.426 0.396 
eis = 1 0.414 0.385 
rra = 3 
eis = 0.01 0.369 0.342 
eis = 0.1 0.339 0.314 
eis = 0.33 0.331 0.301 
eis = 0.5 0.314 0.286 
eis = 1 0.252 0.225 
Notes: Each column shows the average MPC across 4,000 consumers. 
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[Figure 4] Dynamic Pattern of the Binding Fraction and the Cash-on-Hand 
during the Transition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ‗eis‘ denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ‗rra‘ denotes the risk aversion coefficient 
in Kreps-Porteus preferences. 
 
 
than that with k = 0.3, the magnitude of the decline is much smaller than the 
estimated decline from the survey evidence. The magnitude of the decline in the 
average MPC at the steady state is between 0.013 and 0.030 depending on parameter 
values, which represents approximately 10% to 20% of the estimated decline. We 
conclude that as borrowing capacity increases the intertemporal substitution effect 
immediately lowers the average MPC from additional income available today, but 
this effect is substantially offset over time by the precautionary dissaving effect 
which raises the average MPC from additional income available today. 
While the initial decrease in the MPC is comparable with the estimated decrease 
in the MPC (from 0.47 to 0.33), the decrease in the MPC between two steady states is 
much smaller. That is, when borrowing constraints are initially relaxed, the ability to 
borrow at the level of currently available resources reduces the willingness to spend 
additional income.  But over time, liquid wealth is predicted to be reduced due to 
impatience and the precautionary dissaving effect, so that the willingness to spend 
additional income increases relative to the initial decrease.   
In addition, Figure 4 shows that consumers will hold lower amounts of cash-on-
hand when they have a greater ability to borrow unsecured debt due to the 
precautionary dissaving effect. This result is consistent with that of Bishop (2008).  
Thus, to the degree that credit became easier to obtain in the early 2000s in the US 
through credit cards and other forms of unsecured credit, our model predicts that the 
MPC will initially decrease by a magnitude that is similar to the estimated decrease, 
although as consumers are predicted adjust their savings over time in the simulated 
model, the magnitude of the simulated decrease decreases to about 10%-20% of the 
estimated value from previous studies.  
Borrowing Constraints and the Marginal Propensity to Consume    17 
 
 
 
 
 
Ⅵ. Conclusion 
This study examines whether a model with relaxed borrowing constraints can 
replicate the apparent decline in the average MPC in the US. We theoretically 
analyze the dynamics of the average MPC by using a model with Kreps-Porteus 
preferences, which accounts for independent measures of preferences about risk 
aversion and intertemporal substitution. If the widespread use of credit cards 
indicates that consumers are less borrowing constrained than they were a generation 
ago, they should be better able to maintain a steady level of consumption 
expenditure over time (which we call the intertemporal substitution effect) and 
should have less incentive to save (which we call the precautionary dissaving effect). 
The model shows that the first effect is dominant immediately after borrowing 
constraints are relaxed and that the first effect is offset by the second effect gradually 
as consumers reduce their assets. The model likewise predicts that consumers are 
substantially less responsive to changes in income immediately after they acquire a 
greater borrowing capacity, although this effect diminishes over time as they reduce 
their assets. The results of this paper therefore suggest that temporary tax cuts or tax 
rebates will be less effective in boosting consumption expenditure when consumers 
have a greater borrowing capacity.  
In addition to credit card borrowing, other types of household borrowing 
capacity may have also grown during the past few decades. Securitization and 
decreasing interest rates may have given consumers a greater ability and incentive to 
use home-secured debt for greater consumption expenditure (See Aizcorbe, 
Kennickell, and Moore (2003)). Future work could enhance the model in this paper 
by including durable goods or illiquid assets that allow consumers to borrow more 
secured debt.  
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Appendix 1. 
<Table A-1> Implied Values of the Average MPC for Alternative Distributions 
of the Individual MPC 
 
a b c m  
0.0031 2.0291 0.9850 0.4715 
0.0331 2.0058 0.9900 0.4710 
0.0624 1.9831 0.9950 0.4705 
0.0912 1.9680 1.0000 0.4701 
 
 
See Shapiro and Slemrod (2002) for the parameterization of the distribution of 
individual MPCs. m  denotes the average MPC. To maintain non-negative a, c must 
be equal to or greater than 0.9850. 
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Appendix 2. How to Solve the Dynamic Optimization Problem 
under Kreps-Porteus Preferences   
1. Reducing the Number of State Variables in the Maximization 
Problem 
 
The value function is multiplicatively separable with respect to expected long run 
average income, so it can be normalized by this value to reduce the number of state 
variables from two to one.  In effect, randomness in nature for consumers is 
reduced from two dimensions to one dimension, and consumers are modeled to 
have a lifetime perspective and care only about available resources relative to their 
expected long run average income, rather than available resources and expected long 
run average income separately. 
Consider the value function in the second to the last period: 
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and so on.  In general, ),(),( tttttt PXpVpPpXV  ,  where tPp /1 ; that is, 
)(tV  is homogenous.   
Since the terminal period was chosen arbitrarily, we can find the solution to the 
original problem in each period if we solve the normalized one-state problem 
)( tt xv .  That is, )(maxarg tt
c
xv
t
 implies ),(maxarg ttt
C
PXV
t
 for any t.   
The problem for a representative consumer whose preferences are represented by 
the Epstein-Zin function therefore becomes 
 
}]]])())([([)1[(max{)( /1/111
   ttttt
c
tt GNxvEcxv
t
 
 
subject to: 
 
111 
 tGN
Rs
t
tx   
ttt cxs   
11   tty   
 
where the lower case variables represent upper case variables normalized by tP . 
Necessary conditions for maximization 
To derive the first order condition of this normalized problem, assume that we 
have already found the optimal value function, v(x), for all periods except for t and t 
+ 1.  Perturb the allocation of resources in t and t + 1 such that the derivative of un-
maximized normalized utility (ut) with respect to the choice variable is equal to zero: 
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so that 
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which implies that 
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Let 
 /111 ]])([[   tttt GNuE  so that the first order condition is rewritten as 
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Note that 
 t  and the stochastic 

1tu  have inverse powers and if α = ρ, the 
first order condition results in the expected utility first order condition.  Note also 
that under certainty (when risk is irrelevant), the expected utility first order 
condition results and the value function is a transformation of the expected utility 
function.  
 
 
2. Backward Induction in the Maximization Problem 
 
In the last period of life, it is optimal to consume all resources if there is no 
bequest motive.  (If there is a bequest motive, then one could specify that it is 
optimal to leave a fixed amount at the end of life.)  Since the future value function is 
modeled to be zero after death, the value function in the last period is defined as 
TTT xxv )( .  Given this extra constraint, we can iteratively solve for the optimal 
level of consumption expenditure in each period.  Beginning with period T – 1, we 
specify a level of the normalized state variable and find consumption as a function of 
1Tx  from the first order condition:   
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If the representative consumer is not borrowing constrained, the first 
order condition holds exactly.  If he is constrained, we set kxc TT   11 .  To find 
the optimal level of consumption, 
)( 1
*
1  TT xc , we plug each solution to the above 
equation to find the one that maximizes  
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However, because the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of 
saving are convex over the entire domain, there is a unique solution to the first order 
condition t .  After finding this unique optimal level of consumption expenditure 
in T – 1, we use the value )( 11  TT xv  to solve the first order condition in period T – 
2.  Thus, we proceed iteratively until we reach the beginning of the representative 
consumer's working life. 
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3. Discretizing the Distribution of Error Terms in the Maximization 
Problem 
 
To approximate the integrals in the expected value operator, we construct a 
discrete approximation based on a one dimensional Gauss-Hermite quadature given 
that ln Nt+1 and ln εt+1 are normally distributed and independent.  We use 10 
discrete points from a one dimensional quadature for both ln Nt+1 and ln εt+1.  
Because multidimensional quadatures are extremely difficult to calculate, non-
independent errors would be difficult to approximate. Expectations are modeled to 
be a function of probabilities of changes in the normalized state variable, conditional 
on information available today.  From the independent normal distributions of ln 
Nt+1 and ln εt+1, we select 10 Gauss-Hermite discrete points from each distribution 
and weight them accordingly.  (See Secrest and Stroud (1966) for the points and 
weights for a one dimensional Guass-Hermite quadrature.)  The approximation of 
expected value (utility) of random cash on hand using this procedure is based on the 
following: 
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where CDF( ) is the cumulative distribution function of ( ), pdf( ) is the probability 
distribution function of ( ), and d represents the total derivative. 
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i  is the weight for the ith discrete point of the distribution of n and j  is the 
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weight for the jth discrete point of the distribution of z for i, j = {1,2,…,10} such that 
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Thus, we can approximate the first order condition as: 
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To make this equation easier to read, drop the arguments of the functions and let 
2
lnln 2/12 NNinGe
  .  The approximate first order condition reduces to 
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Let )( tt xc  be the solution to this equation (and the approximate solution to the 
first order condition).  The value function can be solved, given a level of liquid 
wealth tx  for each solution )( tt xc  and given that the problem has be solved for 
period t+1. 
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